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The Nuclear Straitjacket
AMERICAN EXTENDED DETERRENCE 
AND NONPROLIFERATION
Benoit Pelopidas
IN THIS CHAPTER , I  discuss the  future of US extended nuclear deterrence 
and the possibility of change in nuclear weapons and alliance policies. While 
several chapters in this book document and analyze the limits of extended 
deterrence arrangements, the goal of this chapter is to take a step back and 
look at the understanding of history that frames possi ble and desirable 
change in US nuclear weapons policy and submit it to historical critique based 
on Eu ro pean case studies.1 I start by asking a specifi c question: Does the his-
torical rec ord suggest that extended nuclear deterrence has been a relevant 
tool for nuclear nonproliferation? To answer it, I identify a common and 
problematic framing of the question, the nuclear straitjacket, and analyze its 
policy implications before focusing on two Eu ro pean case studies: the United 
Kingdom and France.2
The nuclear straitjacket frames the requirements of national security as 
a binary choice between nuclear security guarantees from an ally and the 
quest for an in de pen dent nuclear deterrent. I call it the nuclear straitjacket 
because it limits itself to two ultimate security guarantors, both of which are 
nuclear. Most im por tant, it does not leave any room for a third understand-
ing of national security that would not rely on nuclear weapons.
To assess the nuclear straitjacket, negative security guarantees will be 
set aside and the focus will be on the positive ones.3 In other words, the se-
curity guarantees coming from a nuclear- weapons- free zone (NWFZ) mem-
bership or a non- nuclear status  under the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) are 
outside the realm of this analy sis. The relationship that will be tested as 
a decisive component of the nuclear straitjacket is based on a strategy of 
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extended nuclear deterrence.4 This strategy introduces a relationship among 
three types of actors: the protector, the protégé, and the potential aggres-
sor.5 It is worth highlighting that these are categories of actors and not sin-
gle actors; thus, the number of actors in each category can be more than one.
The nuclear straitjacket assumes a specifi c type of this relationship based 
on the idea that extended nuclear deterrence is a necessary tool for nuclear 
nonproliferation and disarmament, which are two modalities of renunciation 
of nuclear weapons.6 It signifi cantly affects the relationship I have just de-
picted. Classical extended deterrence is a promise of action from the protec-
tor that is expected to deter the potential aggressor from attacking the 
protégé. If you consider that these weapons have to play a role in nonprolif-
eration policy or, more broadly, in a policy producing incentives to give up 
nuclear weapons ambitions, the assumptions about the relationship among 
the three types of players become much more demanding. The protector is 
still threatening to use its weapons to deter the potential aggressor from at-
tacking but, in addition, this move from the protector is supposed to have an 
impact on the protégé and deter it from producing its own nuclear weapons. 
It is now clearer how the notion of nuclear straitjacket is based on the idea 
that a commitment of extended nuclear deterrence is at least a necessary con-
dition for renunciation of nuclear weapons.
In this chapter, I will demonstrate the importance of identifying and in-
vestigating the nuclear straitjacket and test the version of the nuclear strait-
jacket that assumes that positive nuclear security guarantees are both 
necessary and suffi cient conditions across cases for states to give up nuclear 
weapons. Even though there is less commentary implying that nuclear secu-
rity guarantees are suffi cient because of the credibility issue, it is worth show-
ing that even when they  were as credible as possi ble, they  were still not 
suffi cient to prevent proliferation.7 This is why I focus on the United King-
dom and France before 1957–1958: They  were founding members of NATO 
and close US allies, in a context in which only few other states possessed nu-
clear weapons and the protector’s homeland was not yet vulnerable to a mas-
sive nuclear retaliatory strike from the potential aggressor, which made its 
pledge of using nuclear weapons against the aggressor of an ally as credible 
as possi ble. To do so, I will show that (1) the nuclear straitjacket is implicit in 
the mainstream paradigms of international relations (IR) theory dealing with 
proliferation issues, and (2) it has po liti cal effects on the framing of possi ble 
and desirable nuclear weapons policies in the United States even though (3) 
it is not supported by the historical rec ord and does not adequately portray 
the way French and British leaders conceived of the nuclear choices they could 
make.
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The Nuclear Straitjacket and Nuclear History in Mainstream 
International Relations
In international relations theory, the most famous proponents of structural 
realism, area studies specialists inspired by it, and even critical voices have 
formulated forecasts and policy recommendations based on the nuclear strait-
jacket, even if their analytical assessments are often formulated in probabi-
listic terms.8 Major proponents of structural realism argued that the 
protection offered by the two superpowers during the Cold War was the es-
sential cause of nuclear nonproliferation during that period. This led to a 
series of proliferation forecasts about the post– Cold War period.9 Benjamin 
Frankel offers the clearest formulation of this alternative when he writes that 
“there is an inherent contradiction between welcoming the end of bi polar ity 
and deploring the spread of nuclear weapons” and “it is precisely the large 
size and sophistication of the superpowers’ nuclear forces, and the avowed 
willingness of the superpowers to threaten to use them on behalf of their 
clients, . . .  that have prevented a more pervasive weapons proliferation.”10 
Most recently, Michael Horowitz phrases the nuclear straitjacket in terms of 
likelihood when he writes that “[i]n a world where progress towards arms re-
ductions reverses, some states with civilian nuclear power might begin to 
prepare quietly for a world where they need to build their own small nuclear 
arsenal. Such an outcome might become likely if the economic struggles in 
the United States lead the country to pull back signifi cantly from its inter-
national obligations, including its extended deterrence umbrella.”11
A similar tendency can be identifi ed in works of area studies specialists 
inspired by structural realism. Beyond the works of John Mearsheimer on 
the necessity of an in de pen dent nuclear deterrent in Ukraine, Fiona Hill and 
Pamela Jewett can be mentioned.12 A few months before Kiev deci ded to give 
its weapons back to Rus sia, it insisted on the protection that these weapons 
would offer against a Rus sia depicted as expansionist, notably because of the 
remaining Rus sian minority in Eastern Ukraine.13 Similarly, Yair Evron ac-
cepts the idea that the end of bi polar ity created additional incentives to get 
nuclear weapons.14 Some interpretations of the German case and, more 
broadly, of nuclear abstinence inside the Eu ro pean community tend to rely 
on the nuclear straitjacket.15 Most recently, Andrew Kennedy argued that 
“implicit nuclear umbrellas” and disarmament diplomacy  were key  drivers of 
Indian nuclear restraint  until 1998.16
Even critical voices like Glenn Chafetz, who intends to build an “al-
ternative to the neo- realist perspective” for the post– Cold War world, 
ends up transposing the argument of the nuclear straitjacket at the level of 
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perceptions. In his view, what matters for forecasting proliferation is not 
 whether the protector will maintain its security guarantee but if the protégé 
believes the protector will do so.17 This approach leaves room for the possi-
bility that the protégé could misinterpret the intentions of the protector and 
decide not to go for the bomb even though the protector has not made a sin-
cere credible pledge. Thus, the protégé in this instance would not go nuclear 
because it believes that the protector’s defective pledge of extended nuclear 
deterrence is valid. The fact that the protégé makes a  mistake should not mask 
that its supposed reasoning remains the same.18 Most recently, Francis Gavin 
argues that the resolve to strike as a foundation of a credible nuclear security 
guarantee might have created incentives to go for the bomb for countries to 
which the deterrent pledge is not extended, but he does not criticize the effi -
cacy of extended nuclear deterrence as a nonproliferation tool.19
The latest instance of the nuclear straitjacket can be found in the con-
temporary studies of the Saudi case in the context of the Ira nian nuclear cri-
sis. The two sides of the nuclear straitjacket now appear as prominent voices 
in the discussion:  Either Saudi Arabia will receive a nuclear security guaran-
tee from the United States, or it will develop its own nuclear arsenal in the 
near  future.20 The nuclear straitjacket, defi ned as an alternative between nu-
clear positive security guarantees and the quest for an in de pen dent nuclear 
deterrent, seems to be an implicit understanding of nuclear choices for more 
than just structural realist IR theorists. Let us now examine the impact of 
this view on contemporary debates related to nuclear weapons.
The Po liti cal Effects of the Nuclear Straitjacket 
on Contemporary US Debates
The Rus sian Federation and the United States possess more than 90  percent 
of the nuclear warheads on Earth, and these two states are still using some 
form of extended nuclear deterrence inherited from the Cold War.21 The Rus-
sian military doctrine of 2000 read that:
The Rus sian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against states party 
to the Nonproliferation Treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons except 
in the event of an attack on the Rus sian Federation, the Rus sian Federation 
Armed Forces or other troops, its allies, or a state to which it has security 
commitments that is carried out or supported by a state without nuclear 
weapons jointly or in the context of allied commitments with a state with 
nuclear weapons.22
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The doctrines published in February 2010 and December 2014 repeat the 
same idea.23 The Rus sian commitments  under the Tashkent Treaty (also 
known as the Collective Security Treaty) suggest, however, that an attack 
against one member of the alliance is tantamount to an attack against all, and 
this in turn suggests a commitment that is close to the concept of extended 
nuclear deterrence.24 Even if that is the case, and given that it is not the es-
sential mission assigned to Rus sian nuclear forces, the United States is the 
only country that cites the requirements of extended nuclear deterrence as 
justifying the size of its arsenal.25
The other nuclear weapons states, whose arsenals are considerably 
smaller, adopt three  different attitudes  toward extended nuclear deterrence, 
all of which have one thing in common: None of them use the criterion of 
the imperative to protect allies to justify the size of the national arsenal. Some 
offer an extended nuclear deterrence of some sort to other states without le-
gally binding agreements, a second group does not offer extended nuclear 
deterrence at all, and a third group not only refrains from offering it but pub-
licly criticizes the United States and Rus sia for their extended deterrence 
commitments.
In the 2008 and 2013 White Books on National Defense and Security, France 
reaffi rms that its strategic nuclear forces contribute to the security of the EU 
and NATO. This builds on the 1974 Ottawa Declaration, which states that 
its nuclear forces are “capable of playing a deterrent role of their own con-
tributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance.”26 It 
does not refer to extended deterrence to justify the size of its nuclear arsenal. 
The 2008 White Book insists on the in de pen dence of the national nuclear 
forces vis- à- vis NATO and the fact that the engagement of French forces in 
any case would not be automatic.27 Thus, “France will keep on maintaining 
its nuclear forces at a level of strict suffi ciency. Paris will adjust them con-
stantly at the lowest level compatible with its security.”28 Compared to the 
American case, what can be called a French extended deterrence is offered 
to allies that do not necessarily demand it or might even be opposed to it.29 
Except for the Lisbon Treaty, these French commitments are not legally 
binding. In spite of the fi rst comments that  were given, the defense agree-
ment between France and the United Arab Emirates signed in 2009 cannot 
be considered as an extended deterrence agreement. The assessments stat-
ing that France was committing itself to guarantee the security of the Emir-
ates with all means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, have been 
denied by the French authorities.30
In the second category, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, and North 
 Korea simply do not offer any form of extended nuclear deterrence.31 Israel 
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obviously does not do it  either because one of the requirements of an extended 
deterrence pledge is that the protector has to convey the message clearly both 
to the protégé and the potential aggressor. Israel’s offi cial policy of not being 
the fi rst nation to introduce nuclear weapons in the  Middle East does not 
make this possi ble.32
Finally, in the third category, China sticks to the notion of minimum 
deterrence.33 It does not practice extended nuclear deterrence and has issued 
several proposals to give incentives to the United States and Rus sia to give 
up this practice.34
With res pect to contemporary positive nuclear security guarantees, the 
United States is thus an exceptional case because it both offers positive nu-
clear security guarantees and defi nes the size of its nuclear arsenal based on 
the perceived requirements of these guarantees. This suggests that it is nec-
essary to focus on the US case in order to assess the historical rec ord of the 
nuclear straitjacket. The nuclear straitjacket has three consequences: justifi -
cation of past extended deterrence policies as successes in nonproliferation, 
denial of the possibility for the protector to give up nuclear weapons, and 
limitation of the possi ble reduction of its arsenal in the name of nonprolif-
eration.
Since the beginning of NATO, US positive nuclear security guarantees 
have been part of a policy of reassurance  toward its allies, one that has con-
tinued  after the end of the Cold War.35 On October 18, 2006, less than ten 
days  after the fi rst North Korean nuclear test, US secretary of state Condo-
leezza Rice went to Tokyo and declared publicly that “[t]he United States has 
the will and capability to meet the full range— and I underscore full range—
of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”36 Three days  later, US 
secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld reaffi rmed US support for South  Korea 
who, he said, was still included  under a US “nuclear umbrella.”37 His succes-
sor, Robert Gates, made a similar move on October 21, 2009, fi ve months  after 
the second North Korean nuclear test.38 The United States has long made 
similar declarations with res pect to the Atlantic Alliance in Eu rope and, at 
least  until the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), its extended deterrence 
commitments have represented positive nuclear security guarantees that in-
cluded potential fi rst use of nuclear weapons to protect an ally that would be 
attacked with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.39
Beyond the goal of reassurance, this practice of offering positive nuclear 
security guarantees is now presented as a nonproliferation tool and it has been 
retrospectively declared successful in that res pect. This is the fi rst po liti cal 
effect of the nuclear straitjacket. In December 2008, the Report of the Sec-
retary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management stated 
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that “[t]he United States has extended its nuclear protective umbrella to 30- 
plus friends and allies as an expression of commitment and common purpose 
as well as a disincentive for proliferation.” 40 This report also quotes the 1998 
annual defense report stating that “[n]uclear forces remain an im por tant dis-
incentive to nuclear, biological, and chemical proliferation.” 41 The exact same 
idea is expressed in the May 2009 report to the US Congress in preparation 
for the Nuclear Posture Review. “During the Cold War,” it said, “prolifera-
tion was strongly inhibited by the relationships of extended deterrence es-
tablished by the United States (and also by the Soviet Union).” 42 One can 
argue that during the Cold War, the politics of the two blocs  were based on 
the nuclear straitjacket.43 The classical formulation of this approach is Wil-
liam Walker’s notion of a nuclear order based on a “managed system of de-
terrence” and a “managed system of abstinence.” 44 The meeting between 
French president Charles de Gaulle and US secretary of state John Foster 
Dulles on June 5, 1958, offers an explicit illustration of the nuclear straitjacket 
as a framework of the early US nonproliferation policy.45 On the one hand, 
de Gaulle affi rmed that France was becoming a nuclear power and intended 
to proceed to a test soon. As a consequence, the United States limited its nu-
clear cooperation with France in the name of nonproliferation. Washington 
argued that its resolve to protect Eu rope and its openness to share its strate-
gic forces should deter the Eu ro pe ans from developing autonomous nuclear 
arsenals.46
This dual role assigned to nuclear weapons— where they act both as a 
security guarantee for the United States and allies and as a nonproliferation 
tool— has another major effect beyond the justifi cation of past extended de-
terrence policy as a success of nonproliferation: It limits the possi ble reduc-
tions in size of the US arsenal, to say nothing of complete disarmament. This 
reasoning has been expressed in preparatory reports leading to the 2010 Nu-
clear Posture Review as well as in the fi nal document itself and in several 
public speeches by US offi cials. The report to Congress is consistent with 
the view previously quoted and repeats that “the United States will need to 
sustain a deterrent for the indefi nite  future.” 47 This echoes several offi cial 
speeches delivered by Barack Obama before and  after he took offi ce as well 
as by Secretary Gates. For example, in his interview with Arms Control  Today 
in December 2008, president- elect Obama said the following: “I have made 
it clear that Ame rica will not disarm unilaterally. Indeed, as long as states 
retain nuclear weapons, the United States will maintain a nuclear deterrent 
that is strong, safe, secure, and reliable.” 48 At the same time, Secretary Gates 
was explaining that “the nuclear arsenal is vital because the  future cannot 
be predicted.” 49 The 2010 Quadriennal Defense Review restated the need to 
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maintain a nuclear arsenal for reasons including the security of allies: “We 
will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on 
the United States, and on our allies and partners.”50 The May 2009 Report 
to Congress is particularly interest ing because it articulated explicitly the 
link between extended deterrence and the limitation of nuclear arms reduc-
tion: “A policy agenda that emphasizes unilateral reductions could weaken 
the deterrence of foes and the assurance of allies.”51 If even the po liti cal goal 
of unilateral deep reductions is described as contradictory to the US commit-
ments in terms of extended deterrence, complete unilateral nuclear disarma-
ment is pushed even further into the realm of the impossible. This argument 
about the limitation of possi ble arms reduction relies on the assumption that 
the requirements of extended deterrence justify the existence of a larger arse-
nal than the one that would have been assigned to the defense of the na-
tional territory only. This is articulated most clearly in the Council on Foreign 
Relations April 2009 report entitled U.S. Nuclear Policy.
Although the United States does not need nuclear weapons to compensate 
for conventional military weaknesses, other states are not in a similar 
position— they may consider acquiring nuclear weapons to deter attacks. 
The United States has the responsibility to assure allies through extended 
deterrence commitments. This assurance helps convince many of these al-
lies not to acquire their own nuclear weapons. . . .  A related pillar, neces-
sary to maintain the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent for as long as 
it is needed, is to ensure that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is safe, secure and 
reliable.52
The text of the May 2009 report to the US Congress in preparation for the 
Nuclear Posture Review explicitly echoes this reasoning.
[The United States] must continue to safeguard the interests of its allies [ . . .  ]. 
Their assurance that extended deterrence remains credible and effective 
may require that the United States retain numbers or types of nuclear ca-
pabilities that it might not deem necessary if it  were concerned only with 
its own defense.53
The fi nal text of the Nuclear Posture Review restates the same two argu-
ments about the role of extended nuclear deterrence. It is meant to reassure 
the allies as well as to deter them from acquiring their own nuclear weapons.
The United States will retain the smallest possi ble nuclear stockpile con-
sistent with our need to deter adversaries, reassure our allies. . . .  By main-
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taining a credible nuclear deterrent, . . .  we can reassure our non- nuclear 
allies and partners worldwide of our security commitments to them and 
confi rm that they do not need nuclear weapons capabilities of their own.54
The last formulation is worth noting because it relates to the formulation of 
the nuclear straitjacket in terms of a necessary condition: Extended nuclear 
deterrence helps to convince other actors not to go nuclear but is not per-
ceived as suffi cient for preventing them from  doing so. Other conventional 
security guarantees should be added to constitute an effective nonprolifera-
tion architecture.55
Now that the three po liti cal effects of the nuclear straitjacket— justifying 
past extended deterrence policies as successes in nonproliferation, denying 
the possibility for the protector to give up nuclear weapons ambitions, and 
limiting the possi ble reduction of its arsenal— have been identifi ed, it is time 
to assess its historical accuracy.56
The Nuclear Straitjacket in France and the United Kingdom
This section will shed light on the two Eu ro pean nuclear weapons states as 
parts of a broader investigation of one side of the nuclear straitjacket: Could 
a positive nuclear security guarantee be a suffi cient condition for giving up 
nuclear weapons ambitions?57 If one admits that both the United States and 
the Soviet Union also committed their nuclear weapons to the protection of 
their allies through the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, any success-
ful proliferater coming from any of these alliances should be considered an 
anomaly.58
To strengthen my critique of the positive nuclear security guarantee as 
a suffi cient condition for giving up nuclear weapons ambitions, I test this ar-
gument against cases in which it should be easily established. To that effect, 
I focus on cases in which the protector’s pledge is most credible, the rela-
tionship between protector and protégé is deep and well- established, and the 
presence of nuclear- armed powers considered as potentially hostile to the 
protégé is minimal. Regarding the fi rst condition of the highest credibility 
of the pledge, I assume that the credibility has to do with the expected costs 
of keeping the pledge, and those costs are lowest when the protector is not 
vulnerable to a massive nuclear retaliatory strike from the protégé’s expected 
aggressor and when the number of potential nuclear- armed aggressors is 
lower.59 Those are not the only factors but, for the purpose of this essay, I 
will consider them as the most im por tant ones. So I will focus on the fi rst 
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years of the nuclear age,  until 1957–1958, which, as shown below, meet all cri-
teria.
At least  until the successful launch of Sputnik in October 1957, which 
suggested that the Soviet rocket program was more advanced than had 
been expected, the French and British realized that the US homeland was 
not vulnerable to a massive Soviet nuclear attack.60 There is no evidence 
that the earlier American concerns of the vulnerability of their homeland 
 were communicated to their allies.61
On the French side, retrospective assessments suggest that a few strate-
gists raised questions before Sputnik, but it did not  really change the conver-
sation.62 We know that on November 15, 1957, four members of the new 
French government had a confi dential meeting about the consequences of 
Sputnik, about the consequences of the increasing threat of Soviet inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on the US homeland, and on the US 
commitment to deploy troops in Eu rope.63
On the British side, even Sputnik did not make much of a difference. Be-
fore Sputnik, British intelligence assessed that the trial tests of Soviet ICBMs 
would not be completed before 1962 and that operational quantities would 
not be available before 1964.  After Sputnik, the Joint Intelligence Council 
maintained that it did not mean a greatly increased Soviet capacity in the near 
 future. It never believed that there was a missile gap and, as late as January 
1958, it wrote that it was “most improbable that suffi cient stocks of ICBMs 
are now available to enable the Soviet leaders to launch a massive attack on 
the US, or that they will be in a position to do so for some time to come.”64 
Summarizing the US and British intelligence on the issue, Michael Good-
man concluded that “there  were never any serious beliefs that the USSR 
would launch a nuclear offensive largely because the means did not exist to 
effectively threaten the American mainland.”65 The expected reputation costs 
of using nuclear weapons also increase with time if you accept the existence 
of a taboo or tradition of nonuse of nuclear weapons. So the costs of keeping 
the extended deterrence pledge  were lower prior to 1958.
One might object that the doctrine of massive retaliation, publicized in 
January 1954, made a credible extended deterrence pledge more diffi cult than 
a doctrine that would involve using nuclear weapons  later in the confl ict. 
However, this theoretical objection is irrelevant as it does not match the per-
ception of the Eu ro pean allies at the time. Refl ecting in 1983 on the debate 
on alternatives to massive retaliation in the early 1960s, Raymond Aron of-
fers the best summary of why the allies did not see them as improving the 
credibility of the US extended deterrence pledge. He writes: “Valid in the 
abstract, this theory [that the use of nuclear weapons becomes more credible 
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when it is contemplated only as a last resort,  after all other means have been 
used] never convinced the Eu ro pe ans for two main reasons: they did not ac-
cept the great  battle, waged on their soil [and] they did not consent to the 
effort in terms of conventional weaponry which was asked of them.”66 Not 
only is this theoretical objection irrelevant to the actors at the time. Even if 
it was, it would not compensate for the fact that  until 1958, the United States 
did not need to fear a Soviet nuclear retaliation or large reputation costs and 
that the allies realized it.67
So the credibility of the US pledge to retaliate with nuclear weapons if 
one of its allies is attacked is at its peak before 1957–1958 because the costs of 
keeping it are lower than ever and the allies know it: The US homeland is 
not yet vulnerable to a massive nuclear strike from the Soviet Union and there 
is no other nuclear- armed  enemy. So if extended nuclear deterrence was a 
suffi cient condition for nonproliferation, as assumed by the variant of the 
nuclear straitjacket tested  here, it should be easier to establish in this period. 
Even then, however, the United Kingdom and France appear as two major 
anomalies, which will be analyzed below.68
Both nations are founding members of NATO and, before  going nuclear, 
the United Kingdom had developed a special relationship with the United 
States: The relationship between the former imperial power and its former 
colony signifi cantly improved  after the First World War. I will show that, in 
both cases, the nuclear straitjacket does not accurately portray the set of 
choices available to British and French leaders as they saw it at the time.
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has had a strategic and nuclear partnership with the 
United States since the beginning of World War II, when the Crown sent 
Sir Henry Tizard and his scientifi c team to the United States to share infor-
mation on nuclear energy.69 However, London did test an A- bomb in the 
Monte Bello Islands on October 3, 1952, and an H- bomb in 1957–1958. This 
represents a strong anomaly for the variant of the nuclear straitjacket tested 
 here for the following reasons.
First, a deep alliance between the United States and the United King-
dom has developed since the 1940s, even before the foundation of NATO. 
The fact that the Mutual Defense Agreement between the two countries was 
not signed before July 3, 1958, should not lead one to neglect the depth of 
cooperation since World War II.70 The signing of the Québec Agreement, 
which included Canada as a third party, on August 19, 1943, made the coop-
eration offi cial and added a military component.71 This agreement  shaped 
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technical cooperation as well as the sharing of information and ideas.72 In 
addition, the three states agreed not to use the bomb against one another or 
to provide information to a third entity without the consent of the other 
two.73 As for the bilateral US- UK relationship, which is my focus  here, an 
interest ing fact is that the British authorities  were asked to approve the use 
of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima before the bombing took place.74 It is true 
that the US Congress did pass the Atomic Energy Act, also known as the 
McMahon Act, in August 1946, and it put an end to the exchange of infor-
mation related to nuclear weapons among the three parties of the Québec 
Agreement. However, there was room for restored cooperation in 1948, when 
the British committed to provide uranium to the United States if it offered 
nuclear assistance in return.75 This was diffi cult in the late 1940s and early 
1950s because of the scandals of espionage involving British scientists and 
high- level diplomats.76 However, the alliance remained and the 1946 Spaatz- 
Tedder Agreement had since authorized the United States to use British air 
bases in peacetime.77 In August 1948,  after the Berlin blockade, the fi rst US 
bombers able to reach the Soviet Union  were deployed in the United King-
dom. In September, the chief of the US Air Force, General Norstad, informed 
the British allies that a group of B-29 bombers would be stationed in the 
United Kingdom permanently from this moment on.78 So post– World War 
II tensions should not hide the depth of the alliance between the United States 
and the United Kingdom, which included a military dimension that was built 
and consolidated before the creation of NATO.
Second, this military alliance could be perceived as based on a positive 
nuclear security guarantee before the United Kingdom deci ded to test a nu-
clear device. It is true that President Truman did not allow the deployment 
of nuclear weapons abroad before April 1951.79 The bombers previously de-
ployed in the United Kingdom  were able to carry and deliver nuclear weap-
ons, but they  were originally deployed without those weapons. However, the 
cooperation between the Royal Air Force and the US Air Force increased to 
such an extent that the British  were convinced a positive nuclear security 
guarantee did exist.80 Prime Minister Attlee was also convinced that the 
United States would consult him before using the nuclear weapons stationed 
in the United Kingdom, and this conviction is based on no offi cial written 
document.81 From the summer of 1956, the V- bomber force, which was able to 
carry fi ssion bombs, entered ser vice. From that moment on, the United States 
has shared part of its strategic planning with the United Kingdom.82  After a 
period of tension following the Suez crisis, detailed agreements  were signed in 
1957–1958 between the Strategic Air Command and its British counterpart.83 
So the presence of US nuclear weapons on British soil, the cooperation 
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between both the British and US air forces, and the personal convictions 
of Prime Minister Attlee suggest that an implicit nuclear security guarantee 
was perceived to be in place. The British conviction that the United States 
was ready to extend its nuclear deterrent to the United Kingdom was there-
fore in existence from the end of the 1940s.84
Third, in spite of this military alliance and the shared perception that it 
included a positive nuclear security guarantee, on January 8, 1947, Attlee deci-
ded that his country had to build an in de pen dent nuclear deterrent, and the 
additional guarantees given  after that date did not change the course of Brit-
ish nuclear history.85 The 1957 and 1958 White Papers insisted on the in de-
pen dence of the British “deterrent”: the fi rst one emphasized that Britain 
required “an appreciable ele ment of nuclear deterrent power of her own” and 
that of 1958 proclaimed that Britain’s nuclear force “in itself constitutes a for-
midable deterrent.”86 In spite of the strength of the ties between the two 
countries and the British pro ject to include the national deterrent in a “de-
terrence in concert” with the United States, not only did the US positive nu-
clear security guarantee never convince the British to give up their weapons 
but plans for the use of nuclear weapons on a strictly national basis  were elab-
orated in parallel in case the NATO security guarantee was withdrawn.87
Finally, the variant of the nuclear straitjacket tested  here does not grasp 
the thinking of the British decision makers. The causes of the 1947 decision 
have almost nothing to do with US extended nuclear deterrence. Rationales 
focused on possessing an in de pen dent capability in case of a confl ict; restart-
ing a nuclear effort in order to restore the nuclear cooperation with the 
United States, which had stopped in 1946; and an “instinctive” desire to pos-
sess the newest weapons.88
Even if one superimposes the nuclear straitjacket onto decision making 
at the time, it becomes clear that it never  really convinced because the nu-
clear alternative to an in de pen dent nuclear weapons system was not believed 
to be credible enough. The existing scholarship on British nuclear history 
shows that doubts about the credibility of the US nuclear security guarantee 
emerged among the chiefs of staff as early as 1957–1958, with the debate on 
“nuclear suffi ciency.”89 But one can fi nd traces of those doubts even earlier. 
In the very early 1950s, the British chief of staff subcommittee on air defense 
already anticipated the coming vulnerability of American cities and its im-
pact on the credibility of the extended deterrence pledge: “Retaliation does 
not provide a global defence, it can only defend those places that are com-
pletely integrated po liti cally. When New York is vulnerable to attack the 
United States will not use her strategic weapon in defence of London. The 
United Kingdom must, therefore, have its own retaliatory defence. Similarly, 
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however, we will not be prepared to sacrifi ce the United Kingdom in the de-
fence of say Darwin, and eventually each po liti cal unit must have its own 
means of retaliation.”90
Other rationales  were developed afterward, and they still remained in-
compatible with the variant of the nuclear straitjacket tested  here. On March 1, 
1955, for instance, Churchill made a military case for British nuclear weap-
ons as capable of hitting targets of relevance that US weapons might not give 
adequate priority to.91 More generally, since the Global Strategy Paper of June 
1952, the alternative to an in de pen dent nuclear deterrent was not the US pos-
itive security guarantee but the development of conventional forces.92 In 
spite of the effect of the Korean War, which created an incentive for conven-
tional rearmament, the long- term trend of British military planning consisted 
of decreasing military spending and increasing reliance on the US security 
guarantee.93 This reasoning, shared by the Labour and Conservative parties, 
never included the possibility of giving up an in de pen dent deterrent.94 In-
stead, it was perceived both as a way to save money on conventional military 
spending and as a power multiplier when combined with the US security 
guarantee.95
So British nuclear history appears as a strong anomaly for the variant of 
the nuclear straitjacket tested  here. The in de pen dent national deterrent and 
the positive security guarantee from the ally, both of which  were nuclear, be-
came combined in British thinking. The same can be said for France.96
France
France is a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949 and of the as-
sociated or ga ni za tion the year  after. As such, it benefi tted from the implicit 
positive nuclear security guarantee that protects all the members. American 
and Canadian bases as well as the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers 
Eu rope  were even installed on French soil.97 However, France did test its fi rst 
A- bomb in the Reggane Desert in Algeria in February 1960, and its nuclear 
capability became fully operational in October 1964 when the Mirage IV 
bombers entered ser vice.98 France then tested its H- bomb in August 1968.99 
For reasons explained above, though, the analy sis presented  here will not 
cover the period  after 1958.
I previously showed that the US authorities approached the French case 
with the nuclear straitjacket logic in the late 1950s. However, France is an-
other strong anomaly for the variant of the nuclear straitjacket tested  here, 
even though it is sometimes neglected because of the misleading identifi ca-
tion of the French nuclear program with the personality of Charles de Gaulle.
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It is true that the degradation of the relationship between France and 
NATO as well as the acceleration of the French nuclear weapons program 
coincided with de Gaulle returning to power in May 1958. Indeed, the room 
for negotiation between France and NATO somewhat disappeared in 1959 
when de Gaulle warned Germany and the United States that France intended 
to withdraw from the Alliance’s operational structure  after the settlement of 
the Algerian crisis or the US presidential elections.100 And on March 17 of this 
same year, the defense council gave the nuclear weapons program (known as 
the force de frappe) “absolute priority.”101 However, interpreting this simulta-
neity is not as easy as it seems and should not reconcile the French case with 
the nuclear straitjacket or with the idea that a positive nuclear security guar-
antee could be suffi cient for states to give up nuclear weapons ambitions.
First, the acceleration of the program or the change in the level of 
priority does not mean that there was no previous desire to acquire these 
weapons. Such an assessment would neglect the decisive roles of Pierre 
Mendès- France and Félix Gaillard in advancing the program, an attempt at 
cooperating with Italy and Germany, as well as fund transfers from the de-
fense bud get to the Atomic Energy Commission before de Gaulle returned.
As early as 1954, Prime Minister Pierre Mendès- France authorized sig-
nifi cant progress in the militarization of the program.102 On October 26, he 
signed a secret decree that created a superior commission for military appli-
cations of atomic energy as well as a committee dedicated to nuclear explo-
sives. The commission never met, but the committee did begin working in 
secret as soon as it was created on November 4, 1954.103 On December 26, 
Mendès- France, president of the Council of Ministers, also participated in a 
meeting at the Foreign Ministry during which some analysts believe the fi nal 
decision to build the bomb was made.104 On December 29, the Commissariat 
à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA; Atomic Energy Commission) created the Bureau 
d’Études Générales (Offi ce of General Studies), which would  later become the 
Direction des Applications Militaires (Direction of Military Applications).105 A 
few days  later, Mendès- France reconsidered the decision of December 26 and 
only wanted to leave the option open. Afterward, he always tried to under-
play his role in French nuclear history.106
Beyond the personal role of Pierre Mendès- France and of the institu-
tions that  were created during his time in offi ce, signs of a per sis tent will to 
develop an in de pen dent nuclear weapons capability can be traced back to the 
period between the fall of the Mendès- France cabinet and the return of de 
Gaulle. Major money transfers to fund the weapons program took place dur-
ing that period.107 On May 20, 1955, the minister in charge of atomic en-
ergy, Gaston Palewski, signed a secret protocol with his  counter parts in the 
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ministries of National Defense and Finance to fund the activities of the 
CEA for the period 1955–1957. The protocol stated that 20 billion francs 
would be transferred from the French defense bud get to fund the activities 
of the CEA, including the building of a nuclear- powered ship and technical 
studies. It included reciprocal mea sures suggesting that the sections of the 
three armies dedicated to nuclear issues could also receive money to fund 
activities in which both the CEA and the Ministry of Defense considered 
they would best perform. This possibility to transfer funding to the armies 
would prove crucial at the time of testing because that phase was delegated 
to them.108 Physicist and chief scientist at the CEA Yves Rocard claims that 
around 1957, 100 billion francs  were transferred from the defense bud get to 
the CEA to fund all the military experiments except testing.109 And in the 
defense bud get for 1957, 37 billion francs  were allocated to studies and pro-
totypes of a nuclear- capable aircraft, which was at the time considered the 
most promising delivery vehicle for a nuclear payload to reach a target be-
yond the Iron Curtain.110
Beyond secret money transfers and fi nancial provisions, parliamentari-
ans started acting explicitly in  favor of a military program, even before the 
Suez crisis. For instance, within the context of the Euratom debate, eight 
French senators feared that treaty commitments might impose restrictions 
on the development of an in de pen dent nuclear force. So, on April 17, 1956, 
they tabled a bill proposing a modifi cation of the 1945 order (ordonnance) giv-
ing birth to the Atomic Energy Commission to create a military division 
within it.111
The attitude of the French representatives during the negotiations of the 
1957 Euratom Treaty and vis- à- vis their Eu ro pean partners is also very tell-
ing of their military ambitions. They lobbied for the construction of power 
plants fueled by natu ral uranium as well as a Eu ro pean enrichment plant. 
They did not seem to want to use the enriched uranium as fuel, so the logi-
cal explanation for the French position is that the enriched uranium would 
be used to build weapons.112 As Col o nel Charles Ailleret, commander of “spe-
cial weapons” in charge of or ga niz ing the fi rst French nuclear test, remem-
bers, “by January 1, 1957, one could consider that the practical decision to 
build and detonate the national atomic bomb was made and that the means 
to start the operations to this end  were already at the disposal of the authori-
ties.”113 In 1957 and 1958, the French authorities went so far as to sign a bi-
lateral agreement with Germany and multiple trilateral agreements with 
Germany and Italy for  future cooperation regarding the Pierrelate uranium 
enrichment plant as well as nuclear- weapons- related cooperation. Even if sev-
eral aspects of this story remain unclear, the French drive for cooperation to 
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speed up the national nuclear weapons program, and its desire to keep it se-
cret from the United Kingdom and the United States and to make sure that 
it would benefi t from it are yet other clues of a nuclear weapons pro ject that 
is meant to be in de pen dent from the United States and, as such, incompati-
ble with the variant of the nuclear straitjacket tested  here.114 Most im por tant, 
in April 1958, former Prime Minister Felix Gaillard made the decision to test 
a nuclear device at the beginning of 1960 and antedated the document to 
April 11, before the fall of his government.115 De Gaulle only confi rmed it. 
Even before the strongest moments of the crisis between NATO and France 
that would coincide with the return of de Gaulle and the increasing level of 
priority given to the nuclear weapons program, Pierre Mendès- France’s role, 
several money transfers, creations of institutions, and Felix Gaillard’s deci-
sion to authorize the testing of a device show that the drive  toward nuclear 
weapons in France predates de Gaulle and the degradation of French rela-
tions with NATO.
Third, neither de Gaulle nor Mendès- France ever thought about the in-
de pen dent national deterrent in terms of the nuclear straitjacket.116 The key 
prob lem was not about the credibility of the nuclear security guarantee; it 
was about the risk of losing in de pen dence. In spite of their ideological dif-
ferences, Mendès- France and de Gaulle shared this sense that “France’s in-
de pen dence had to be defended against the United States.”117 The same could 
be said for Defense Minister Jacques Chaban- Delmas.118 US nuclear weap-
ons could be accepted as possibly strengthening the Alliance and saving some 
money, but they could not be an alternative to an in de pen dent national de-
terrent. Several explicit statements  were made to that effect. On January 24, 
1958, French minister of national defense Jacques Chaban- Delmas told Le 
Monde that “it is impossible for France to give up the bomb. . . .  It would give 
up its rank of world power.”119 De Gaulle was as explicit in his interview with 
Dulles in June 1958 when he told him “this is why we will not refuse your 
weapons.”120 It is true that France perceived a threat from the Soviet Union 
and was afraid of the prospect of Germany rearming. The Soviet threat helps 
to understand why France participated in NATO and the Union of Western 
Eu rope; the German threat accounts for the rhythm of the national program 
as well as the support from Mendès- France.121 However, nuclear weapons ap-
peared above all as instruments of in de pen dence and prestige, and the nu-
clear straitjacket does not approach them as such.  Under the Fourth Republic, 
they  were supposed to strengthen the French voice in NATO and the Union 
of Western Eu rope. The period following the Suez crisis of October 1956 
radicalized this approach and made the nuclear weapons program an instru-
ment to affi rm the in de pen dence of France from the NATO Allies as well as 
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from any other power. De Gaulle, who showed  little interest in the subtle-
ties of nuclear deterrence, personifi ed this understanding of the purpose of 
the French nuclear program  after he returned to power.122
The memory of the Suez crisis should be reinterpreted along this line. 
The nuclear straitjacket reads the crisis as a sign that the United States was 
not an unconditional ally, which decreased the credibility of its positive nu-
clear security guarantee and therefore created an additional incentive to go 
for the bomb. Instead, Dominique Mongin convincingly shows that Suez was 
a step  toward the offi cialization of a policy rather than a win dow of oppor-
tunity for change at the level of policymakers; it was only decisive vis- à- vis 
the public opinion.123 Once you take into account the primacy of the quest 
for in de pen dence, the crisis reveals that “the security of France is entirely 
dependent on the American alliance.”124 Indeed, the integrated command be-
tween the French and the British in the operation Mousquetaire proved to be 
a total failure. It deprived both parties of the ability to take initiatives at crit-
ical moments and ended up with the British yielding to US demands to 
withdraw troops from Egypt.125 Therefore, the reasoning went, in the name 
of national in de pen dence, a national nuclear deterrent had to be built. Even 
the reasons for the crisis with NATO at the beginning of the de Gaulle era, 
which are often presented as supporting the nuclear straitjacket, point to 
this fundamental driver. The heart of the crisis was that de Gaulle wanted 
the French to control the US weapons stationed on their soil. This demand 
eventually led to the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fl eet from 
NATO integrated command and the expulsion of US nuclear forces on 
French soil.126
In sum, a careful reading of French nuclear history shows that the nu-
clear straitjacket was not successful as a policy and was so far away from the 
mind- set of the leaders that it did not provide much leverage.127 This critique 
of the nuclear straitjacket is all the stronger in cases having strong relation-
ships with a protector whose territory is not yet vulnerable to a massive nu-
clear retaliation, in a world of few potentially hostile nuclear weapons states. 
In such circumstances, the promise of extended nuclear deterrence should 
therefore be as credible as possi ble so the hypothesis of the nuclear strait-
jacket should be easier to confi rm. Instead, both the British and the French 
cases indicate that a positive nuclear security guarantee is not a suffi cient con-
dition for all states to give up nuclear weapons and, most im por tant, that the 
nuclear straitjacket does not capture adequately the options available at 
the time to the leaders. For French and British leaders, the decision to go 
nuclear was not a  matter of extended nuclear deterrence or of its degree of 
credibility.
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Conclusion
The be hav ior of two of the closest allies of the United States, the United 
Kingdom and France, shows that extended nuclear deterrence did not pre-
vent them from developing their own national nuclear arsenals. This was the 
case in a world composed of only a few potentially hostile nuclear- armed 
states against which the protector would have had to act, a world in which 
the tradition of nonuse was still in its early years and, most im por tant, a world 
where their protector was not yet vulnerable to a massive nuclear retaliatory 
strike. Since the Eu ro pean allies  were not convinced of the higher credibil-
ity of alternatives to massive retaliation, the pre-1958 context made the US 
pledge of nuclear retaliation in case of an attack against a protégé as credible 
as it ever was. In spite of those conditions, which are particularly favorable 
to the variant of the nuclear straitjacket tested  here, the British and French 
cases remain anomalies and developed their own nuclear arsenals.
The British and the French cases also illustrate the ways in which the 
nuclear straitjacket mischaracterizes the set of policy options available to 
decision- making elites. Nuclear- weapons- related choices are not only depen-
dent on a subjective mea sure ment of the credibility of a pledge based on 
nuclear weapons capabilities, which is why this critique should not be misin-
terpreted as a case for the inevitability of proliferation. On the contrary, the 
number of non- nuclear- weapons states whose security strategies do not de-
pend on an extended nuclear deterrent underlines the widespread existence 
of a non- nuclear understanding of security that is also incompatible with the 
nuclear straitjacket. Indeed, a number of states that have tried to acquire nu-
clear weapons systems for a long time or have managed to acquire them 
 after a long and costly effort have given up without receiving a pledge of ex-
tended nuclear deterrence.128 For instance, in the post- Soviet states, during 
the negotiations that would lead to the renunciation, the strongest emphasis 
was laid on the in de pen dence of the state and the res pect of its sovereignty, 
separate from the nuclear instrument.129 Similarly, Libya put an end to an 
effort of more than thirty years, and South Africa dismantled its nuclear ar-
senal and neither received anything close to an extended nuclear deterrence 
pledge.
This has im por tant implications for historians, analysts, and policymak-
ers: The belief in the nuclear straitjacket as a princi ple working throughout 
nuclear history creates an overestimation of the role of extended deterrence, 
of the need to make the pledge credible, and of the successes of past policies 
based on it. More broadly, neglecting a po liti cal approach of nuclear choices— 
which gives room for the possibility of radical peaceful change over time 
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and accepts the possibility of a non- nuclear understanding of security— could 
lead to misguided policies. As I have shown in the case of the nuclear strait-
jacket, rigid and structural approaches unduly oppose renunciation of nuclear 
weapons on the part of the protector, the reduction of its arsenal beyond a 
given size, and consequently the feasibility and desirability of a world with-
out nuclear weapons. Most im por tant, they induce policymakers to continue 
a nonproliferation policy based on a partial understanding of nuclear history 
and discourage policy innovation outside the proliferation paradigm.130
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